Th is chapter presents an overview of the main characteristics of urban labor markets and the workers employed in them at the turn of the 21st century. Th e descriptive analysis of a dozen 1-2-3 surveys conducted in Africa over the last decade establishes several robust stylized facts about the particularities of these markets. 1 Th e chapter examines a broad sweep of indicators, such as the level of education and the training-employment link; unemployment and underemployment; the distribution of jobs and job properties by institutional sector, especially the informal sector; job quality (earnings and social security coverage); and multiple jobholding. Th ese indicators identify the major trends, which are then studied in detail in the subsequent chapters.
Th is chapter is structured as follows. Th e fi rst section describes the sociodemographic characteristics of the 11 cities studied. Th e second section examines labor force participation. Th e third section looks at unemployment. Th e fourth and fi fth sections examine the structure of employment and labor force characteristics by institutional sector and earned income and working conditions. Th e last section takes up the question of employment prospects, with a focus on young people. Th e chapter devotes special attention to unemployment (which other chapters do not specifi cally address), the informal sector, and earnings. Where possible, indicators are separated by gender.
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Th e population in the main cities of the 10 countries studied totaled nearly 20 million people in the fi rst half of the 2000s ( people live in the seven cities in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); 1.3 million live in Antananarivo, Madagascar, the only representative of the Indian Ocean region. Th e cities range in size from Niamey (675,000 inhabitants) to Kinshasa (5.8 million inhabitants). Th e cities in West Africa represent a small percentage of their countries' populations (6-7 percent in Niamey and Ouagadougou, 22 percent in Dakar), refl ecting the low rates of urbanization in Sahelian Africa. Together the cities studied represent almost 40 percent of the urban population of West Africa. Th e underdevelopment of secondary cities is particularly severe in Senegal, where 53 percent of the population lives in Dakar. Cameroon has two similar-sized main cities (Yaoundé and Douala), which together account for more than 40 percent of the urban population of Cameroon. Focusing on capital cities makes sense in Africa not only because secondary cities are relatively underdeveloped but also because the characteristics and functioning of labor markets are more homogeneous than and diff er greatly from those of other urban areas.
Th e age distribution of the population displays the classic characteristics of cities in developing countries, with a massive predominance of young people. Across the 11 cities, the average age is 22.5. Th e inhabitants of Bamako and Niamey are the youngest (average age 21, median age 17). Gender diff erences in the age distribution are small. Women account for slightly more than half of the population in the 11 cities.
Th e proportion of migrants (people who have not always lived in the city) is substantial in all 11 cities (see chapters 10 and 11). Th e lowest proportions are in Antananarivo (20 percent), Kinshasa (22 percent), and Dakar (28 percent). Th e highest proportions are in Douala (54 percent), Yaoundé (52 percent), and Abidjan (51 percent). Migration is essentially a domestic phenomenon in all of the cities studied: even within WAEMU, the region that is most open to international migration, for example, just 21 percent of migrants are domestic. Migration from abroad accounts for less than 4 percent of migrants in Antananarivo, Kinshasa, and the Cameroonian cities and about 10 percent in Dakar. Th e share of foreign migrants is higher in Lomé (28 percent) and Abidjan (25 percent).
Half of migrants-including two-thirds of women migrants-would like to join their families. Th irty percent of all migrants cite the desire to fi nd a job as their main reason for migrating (the fi gure is even higher among men). Twelve percent cite study as the reason for migrating.
Household Composition
Th e average household size in the cities sampled is 5.1 people, but national averages cover a wide range, from Lomé (3.9 people) to Dakar (7.4 people). More than a quarter of households in Dakar contain 10 or more people. Th is proportion is less than 5 percent in Lomé and Cotonou. Dakar aside, household size can be used to defi ne two groups of cities: the Sahelian cities (Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), with an average household size of 5.6-6.0 people, and the West African coastal cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, and Lomé) and the cities of Central Africa and Madagascar, with an average household size of 4.6 people.
About one in fi ve heads of household is a woman. In the Sahelian countries, the proportion of female household heads is less than 16 percent (less than 10 percent in Bamako). In contrast, in Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé, the share reaches 25-30 percent.
Education
In West Africa, 30 percent of people 10 and older never attended primary school. Th is fi gure is less than 5 percent in Central Africa and the Indian Ocean, two regions that have long promoted schooling (table 1.2) . Th e percentage of people who never attended school is extremely high in Bamako (41 percent), Niamey (36 percent), and Ouagadougou (34 percent). In contrast, just 16 percent of the population in Lomé and 20 percent in Cotonou never attended school. Abidjan (29 percent) and Dakar (31 percent) are in an intermediate position. In Central Africa and Madagascar, there is a tendency to either educate children beyond primary level or to concentrate on the quality of the education provided.
Few changes in the hierarchy between the coastal and Sahelian cities are evident when the focus switches from stock (all cohorts) to fl ow (people still in school). However, some changes are worth mentioning. Ouagadougou, with a net primary enrollment rate of 79.7 percent, catches up to Cotonou (81.2 percent) and Lomé (83.2 percent). Ouagadougou's net lower secondary school enrollment rate is second aft er Cotonou's. In contrast, Abidjan and Dakar leave from one-quarter to one-third of their 6-to 11-year-olds out of the system. With a net primary enrollment rate of 65.9 percent, Dakar performs hardly better than Bamako (70.7 percent). Bamako performs worst across most education indicators, in both stock and fl ow. In Central Africa and Madagascar, Kinshasa has the highest and longest rates of school attendance. Given the failed nature of the state and years of economic and political crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this fi nding is an indicator of the importance the Congolese attach to education.
In all 11 cities, the rate of school attendance has grown steadily over the generations. Some cities, such as Ouagadougou and especially Niamey, have experienced spectacular growth. In Niamey, for example, 88 percent of adults 60 and older but just 16 percent of children 10-14 never attended school (fi gure 1.1). In Ouagadougou, these ratios are 84 percent and 12 percent. Both cities have virtually caught up to cities like Cotonou and Lomé. In the cities where high school enrollment is long established, growth in the rate of school attendance is, of course, less spectacular. In Antananarivo, for example, the younger generation has no greater probability of attending school than its elders, with just 6 percent of each cohort never attending school. Across the board, growth in school enrollment has gone hand in hand with a narrowing in the gender gap. Dakar posts the best performance. Among adults 60 and older, men are four times as likely to have attended school; this diff erence narrows to 7 percentage points among children 10-14. At the other end of the scale, girls are still highly disadvantaged compared with boys in Cotonou and especially Abidjan. Th ere is room for improvement everywhere: in none of the countries studied are girls' enrollment rates equal to boys' .
School enrollment rates have risen markedly in the countries studied: despite the severe public fi nance crisis, increasingly large numbers of children are receiving an education. Th is quantitative performance has probably been secured at the cost of a marked deterioration in the quality of the education provided, however.
Labor Force Participation
Th ere are more than 14 million people of working age (10 and older) across the cities studied: 6.9 million in West Africa, 6.2 million in Central Africa, and 947,000 in Madagascar. On average, nearly 60 percent of them are in the labor force (employed or unemployed). Among people 15 and older, the labor force participation rate is 70 percent. In Abidjan and Lomé, about 70 percent of the population 10 and older is in the workforce. In Niamey, Dakar, Bamako, and especially Kinshasa, labor force participation is lower and averages about 50 percent of the population 10 and older.
Female Employment in the Labor Market
Labor force participation is almost 15 percentage points higher for men than for women (table 1.3) . Th e largest gaps observed are in Niamey (28 points); Dakar Variations in labor force participation rates across cities are much more pronounced for women than for men. Less than 20 percentage points separate the highest rate for male workers (70 percent, in Abidjan) from the lowest rate (50 percent, in Kinshasa). In contrast, the diff erences in female participation rates range from 35 percent (in Kinshasa and Niamey) to 67 percent (in Lomé).
Th e larger diff erences for women refl ect the social role played by women, who divide their time between domestic activities (including childbearing and rearing) and economic activity in the market. On average, women spend 17 hours (and men 4 hours) a week on domestic activities. Th e situation is even more unequal in West Africa, where men spend just 2 hours a week on domestic activities and women 17. Th e least inequitable distribution of domestic chores is in Antananarivo, where men spend 8 hours and women 17. Working women spend more time on domestic activities than women who do not work (18 versus 16 hours), clearly demonstrating the "double day" phenomenon among working women (see chapter 7).
Youth Employment on the Labor Market
Observed labor force participation rates are consistent with the stages of the life cycle. Participation rates rise sharply as people leave the education system and enter the world of work. Th e peak comes at 30-49, when male participation rates top 85 percent across all cities except Kinshasa. Labor force participation rates start to slide aft er 50, plummeting aft er 60.
People 20 and under account for 35 percent of the working-age population (10 and older) in the cities surveyed. Th irty-fi ve percent of these people are active (either working or seeking employment), although the situation varies widely across cities. In Bamako and Niamey, which have the largest percentages of young people, one-quarter of young people work. Th is proportion is 35 percent in Abidjan and 37 percent in Lomé.
Participation rates are higher for girls than for boys, especially in Abidjan and Cotonou, and more girls than boys are in the labor market. In Cotonou, Abidjan, and Lomé, 35-43 percent of young women work-13-15 percentage points more than their male counterparts. Th e youth participation rate is lower (less than 25 percent) elsewhere. In Kinshasa, it is just 7 percent, because of the dual eff ect of higher school enrollment rates and higher inactivity rates (excluding school). Th e diff erences between girls and boys are narrower in Kinshasa than elsewhere.
Children in Africa enter the labor market at a very young age. In West Africa, 13 percent of children 10-14 work (table 1.4) . Th e problem is more severe among girls than boys, with 16 percent of girls and 10 percent of boys participating in the labor force (see chapter 12). Th e phenomenon is less severe in Central Africa and Madagascar, where more children are in school. Nevertheless, in Douala 1 in 10 children 10-14 works, most of them combining school and work. Status within the household also aff ects labor force participation rates. Th e highest rates are among heads of household (86 percent for all 11 cities), followed by their spouses (62 percent) and household members other than spouses and children (51 percent). In last place come children, with the lowest labor force participation rates (31 percent). Household survival relies fi rst and foremost on the head of household. Where necessary, the strategy is then to mobilize the spouse and other household members. Children are sent to work as a last resort.
Labor force participation rates also vary a great deal by migrant status, with 66 percent of migrants (and 43 percent of natives) participating. Th ese diff erences refl ect the fact that the prospect of working draws migrants to cities.
Th e Inactive Population
In West Africa, 41 percent of the potential working population do not have and are not looking for a job. In Bamako, Dakar, and Niamey, about half of the population 10 and older is out of the labor force (table 1.4). Th e two main inactive groups, school children and students, represent between two-thirds and three-quarters of the inactive population in Cameroon and Madagascar (table 1.5). Housewives are the second most important group of inactive people (20 percent in West Africa and about 15 percent elsewhere). Th e proportion of retirees is small, averaging less than 4 percent, refl ecting both a wide-based age pyramid and the need to work aft er 60 because of the insuffi ciency of pensions (see chapter 13).
Th e share and composition of inactive individuals varies across cities. Th ere are proportionally more pupils and students outside West Africa and more inside West Africa in Cotonou and Lomé, and more housewives in Niamey, Dakar, and Bamako.
Almost all (91 percent) of inactive individuals are looked aft er by their families. Only about 5 percent rely on pension income (work, disability, and so forth). Th is fi nding highlights the underdevelopment of institutional transfers, the major role played by solidarity and informal transfers (within and between households), and the massive predominance of earned income in households' total income.
Nearly 70 percent of all inactive individuals chose this status of their own accord, either because they consider themselves too young to work or because they do not need to work to live. However, for 1.85 million inactive individuals (about 30 percent of the inactive population), the absence of work represents a form of hidden unemployment: they have withdrawn from the labor market, either because they believe that the economic situation is too weak or their skills too low to fi nd a job or because they are waiting to hear about a job for which they have applied. On average, people out of the labor force ("discouraged workers") and the unemployed have two more years of education than people who are truly inactive.
Th e magnitude of unused labor supply is large in Africa. Th ese people join or withdraw from the labor market depending on the incentives they face (increases in the demand for labor, the real wage, and so forth). Th e number of jobs that need to be created to mop up unemployment is therefore much higher than the number of unemployed.
Unemployment
Based on the ILO defi nition of unemployment, there are an estimated 963,000 job-seekers in the 11 cities, which corresponds to an average unemployment rate of 12 percent (table 1.6) . Th e rate is slightly higher in Central Africa and much lower in Madagascar, which enjoyed extremely strong growth in 2001, following a trend that began in the mid-1990s. Th e highest unemployment rates are in Ouagadougou (15.4 percent), Kinshasa (14.9 percent), and Yaoundé (14.7 percent). Th e lowest rates are in Antananarivo (4.4 percent) and Cotonou (5.5 percent). Th e ILO defi nition of unemployment is extremely restrictive. It considers as unemployed only individuals who did not work a job during the reference week, even for an hour; were actively looking for a job; and were available to work it. Expanding this defi nition to include inactive individuals who may not have looked for a job during the reference month but who are still available to work a job if off ered one changes the picture in two important ways. First, the unemployment rates increase from 11 percent to 16 percent in West Africa, from 14 percent to 17 percent in Cameroon, and from 15 percent to 24 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where nearly one in four workers is unemployed under the broader-based defi nition (data were not available for Antananarivo) (table 1.7). Second, gender gaps widen, as hidden unemployment aff ects women more than men. Th e broader unemployment concept includes population groups on the fringes of economic activity-young people, women, and seniors-who have weaker connections to the labor market Th e rest of the analysis covers only ILO-defi ned job-seekers who correspond to the international defi nition of unemployment.
For the sample as a whole, nearly as many men (11 percent) as women (12 percent) are unemployed. Th is average conceals some particularities: a higher proportion of women than men are unemployed in Dakar, whereas unemployment rates in Cotonou and Lomé are higher for men than women. Across the board, the rate of unemployment falls with age. Young people in Ouagadougou are the hardest hit, with an unemployment rate of 22.4 percent among people 10-29. On the whole, young labor force participants fi nd it extremely hard to enter the world of work.
Among older participants, Dakar and Abidjan stand out, with an unemployment rate of 10 percent for the intermediate age bracket (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) . Th e oldest age bracket (50+) posts an unemployment rate of more than 11 percent in Niamey.
Th e unemployment rate also varies by level of education and type of training (table 1.8). Paradoxically, the unemployment rate rises with the level of education across all the West African cities. It is lowest among workers who never attended school, presumably because these workers are the least demanding regarding the jobs they will accept. In four West African cities, Central Africa, and Madagascar, the unemployment rates are bell shaped, falling only aft er secondary education. Even in these cities, however, unemployment rates among people who attended university are high, indicating that a degree is no guarantee of protection against unemployment (see chapter 5).
Heads of household (the households' main breadwinners) are the least aff ected by unemployment, with an average rate of 7 percent. "Secondary" members suff er the most from low labor demand, with unemployment averaging 17 percent for "other household members" and 21 percent for children of the head of household. In all countries, unemployment is higher among natives (15 percent) than migrants (11 percent). Th is fi nding refl ects not higher wage expectations but rather the fact that natives are more concentrated in the high unemployment risk categories (younger, more educated, and so forth).
Who Are the Unemployed?
Fift y-fi ve percent of the unemployed are men (table 1.9). Men are the majority in all cities except Dakar, where women represent half of the unemployed, and the two Cameroonian cities (women represent 51 percent of the unemployed in Douala and 56 percent in Yaoundé). Th e average age of the unemployed is 30, but nearly one in four job-seekers (one in two in Ouagadougou) is 15-24. Th e average level of education of the unemployed is eight years of completed studies. Th e unemployed are a heterogeneous population that includes two types of job-seekers: fi rst-time job-seekers and previously employed workers. Fift y-three percent of the unemployed are fi rst-time job-seekers, suggesting that the formal sector has adjusted to economic conditions mainly by freezing recruitment and only secondarily by cutting jobs.
Fift y-seven percent of unemployed women are fi rst-time job-seekers. Firsttime job-seekers represent the majority of unemployed women in all cities; their share is particularly large in Ouagadougou, Niamey, and Kinshasa, where more than 70 percent of unemployed women are fi rst-time job-seekers. First-time job-seekers have more years of education (8.7) than the previously employed (7.6 years), with an even wider gap in West Africa. Th ey also have more years of education than employed women (6.9 years).
Unemployment among the previously employed refl ects the weak economic situation in Sub-Saharan Africa: redundancies, contracts coming to an end, business closures, and staff cuts accounted for 57 percent of job losses. Nearly three in 10 job-seekers were made redundant or came to the end of their contract. One-third of job-seekers in Lomé were made redundant and one-quarter in Ouagadougou lost their job at the end of their contract. Abidjan suff ered the most from the economic downturn (because of the political crisis), with more than 36 percent of job losses caused by closures and staff cuts.
Th e unemployment rate for the previously employed is higher among former public enterprise employees, where it aff ects more than 11 percent of workers (15 percent in Douala and 17 percent in Dakar). Privatization and restructuring have hit redundant employees hard, and a large number of them have not found new jobs.
Across institutional sectors and cities, unemployment hits the bottom of the wage ladder hardest. Whereas less than 6 percent of senior managers are unemployed, 13 percent of unskilled manual and nonmanual employees and 12 percent of laborers are unemployed.
Characteristics and Length of Unemployment
Unemployment averages nearly three and a half years (41 months) in West Africa, 35 months in Cameroon, and more than fi ve years (66 months) in Kinshasa (these fi gures indicate the period during which the unemployed did not work a "real" job rather than the period during which they did not work at all). Nearly two-thirds of job-seekers have been unemployed for more than a year. On the whole, long-term unemployment hits fi rst-time job-seekers harder than it hits the previously employed. Th e long average length of unemployment indicates how very hard it is for the unemployed to enter or reenter the labor market.
Two groups of cities can be distinguished. In the fi rst group, made up of Cotonou, Lomé, Bamako, and especially Antananarivo, the labor market appears to be more fl exible than elsewhere. Th e unemployment rate is below 10 percent, and the length of unemployment is shorter than in other cities. Th e second group, made up of the cities in Central Africa, Dakar, Ouagadougou, and especially Niamey, unemployment rates are higher, and average unemployment lasts four to six years.
Job-Seeking Methods
Th e preferred job-seeking method among the unemployed is to draw on family solidarity networks. Two-thirds of the unemployed deploy this strategy. One in fi ve job-seekers (55 percent in Antananarivo) directly prospects employers. About 4 percent of job-seekers (8 percent in Cotonou and Bamako and 13 percent in Antananarivo) respond to advertisements for jobs.
Only 7 percent of job-seekers are registered with an employment agency, and just 2 percent have actively tried to fi nd a job through that agency. Registration rates are low because the majority of job-seekers (56 percent) are unaware that employment agencies exist. Another 28 percent are pessimistic about the agency's capacity to help them.
Th ese fi ndings suggest that the authorities need to do a better job of helping job-seekers, especially by providing them with information. Employment agencies should make it easier for job-seekers to look for jobs by matching job vacancies that come in from businesses with the profi les of potential applicants. Placement agencies may need to be restructured if they are to perform eff ectively.
Type of Job Sought
Th e majority (59 percent) of job-seekers are looking for a wage-earning job, especially in Central Africa and Madagascar (where this percentage stands at 75 percent). Nearly one-quarter (22 percent) would prefer to be self-employed (8 percent in Antananarivo), and one-fi ft h have no preference regarding the type of employment found. A large majority (70 percent) would like to fi nd permanent, full-time employment with an average working week of 44 hours. Job-seekers are thus not a pool of manpower on the fringe of economic activity.
Th e reasons for preferring one type of employment over another are similar across cities. As might be expected, the majority of people seeking wage employment (58 percent) do so for the security it is supposed to provide in terms of employment and wages. Twenty-fi ve percent of job-seekers are prepared to work in any kind of business, and 48 percent will accept any sector or occupation. Only 10 percent are drawn to public administration, which is not the end-all of a trepid workforce, to use an image that is all-too-oft en evoked. Unemployment therefore is not solely the upshot of dissatisfi ed manpower with ambitions that are incompatible with market conditions. At least in part, it also refl ects the absence of job opportunities.
Earnings Expectations
One possible reason why people are unemployed is that their earnings expectations are unrealistic. Job-seekers in the seven West African cities expect to earn €162 for a 44-hour working week-about twice the average earnings of an employed worker (table 1.10). Only in Ouagadougou and Niamey are expectations closer to reality. Outside West Africa, job-seekers expect to earn €162 a month in Douala (where employed workers earn an average €99 a month), €138 in Yaoundé (where employed workers earn €111), and €67 in Antananarivo (where employed workers earn €58).
However, 75 percent of job-seekers are prepared to revise their earnings demands downward if they remain unemployed too long. Th e reservation earnings-that is, the minimum earnings a job-seeker would accept-is estimated at an average of €118 across the WAEMU region, about €100 in Cameroon, and €48 in Madagascar. Th ese earnings are higher than average earnings in all cities except Antananarivo. Th e explanation for disparities in job-seekers' reservation earnings needs to be developed using such parameters as work experience, skill level, gender, age, and type of employment sought. For example, for identical characteristics (gender, education, potential experience, and migrant status), the minimum wage for which job-seekers would be willing to work is more than 70 percent higher than the earnings of employed workers in their main job in the West African cities and about 40-50 percent higher than in Cameroon. Th is fi nding suggests that aspirations are out of line with actual labor market conditions. In Antananarivo, reservation earnings are not signifi cantly diff erent from actual earnings, which probably has something to do with the low unemployment rate. (Results are not reliable for Kinshasa, where more than half of the unemployed did not answer the question about earnings expectations.)
Job Structure and Dynamics
Forty-four percent of the 7 million people employed in the 11 cities studied were women (table 1.11). Women are very much in the minority in Niamey (36 percent of jobholders); in Cotonou and Lomé, they form the majority. Except in Dakar, Kinshasa, and Antananarivo, migrants form the majority of the employed labor force. Average job seniority is seven years. It is higher in Niamey, Bamako, Dakar, and Kinshasa, partly because of a slightly higher average age in these cities.
For the sample as a whole, the rate of wage employment (wage workers as a percentage of all workers), an indicator of the extent of the formalization of labor relations, is 39 percent (35 percent in West Africa). Th e highest rates of wage employment are in Antananarivo and Cameroon (slightly more than half of all workers) and in Abidjan (41 percent) and Dakar (38 percent), the two most prosperous cities in West Africa.
Multiple jobholding is oft en considered to be a household and individual strategy for increasing income and off setting declines in income during recessions. Th e rate of multiple jobholding is 8 percent for the sample as a whole. In West Africa, the lowest rate of multiple jobholding (less than 5 percent) is in the two largest cities (Dakar and Abidjan). In contrast, 9 percent of workers in Cotonou hold a second job. Th e highest rate of multiple jobholding is in Antananarivo (14 percent). Th ese fi gures belie the notion that multiple jobholding is the norm in Africa.
Nearly half of all workers (49 percent) head up their own production unit, either as an employer with Wage-earners or as an own-account worker. Th e cities in West Africa can be classed into three groups. In Bamako, Lomé, and Cotonou, about 60 percent of workers are self-employed; in Ouagadougou and Niamey, just under 50 percent are self-employed; in Abidjan and Dakar, 45 percent of workers are self-employed. Th e situation is more disparate in Central Africa and Madagascar, where the proportion is 36 percent in Antananarivo, Th e job structure by sector reveals the predominance of trade and services (the "tertiary" sector). Th is sector accounts for at least three-quarters of all jobs, except in Antananarivo (60 percent) (table 1.12). Industrial activities account for a little more than one-fi ft h of jobs. Th eir weight is heaviest in Dakar (28 percent), Niamey (26 percent), and Antananarivo (35 percent), where a buoyant export processing business sector exists, especially in textiles. Suburban agriculture remains marginal (3 percent), with a maximum of 5 percent in Kinshasa, Niamey, Antananarivo, and Ouagadougou.
Th e distribution of jobs by institutional sector is a good composite indicator of the structure of the labor market. Th e largest sector is the informal sector, which employs 70 percent of workers on average and up to 76 percent in West Africa. Th e formal private sector is in second place, with 17 percent of jobs. Only 11 percent of employed people work in the public sector (8 percent in the administration and 3 percent in public and semipublic enterprises). Th e very small share of public employment invalidates the idea of a bloated public sector.
Th e structure by institutional sector reveals some remarkable similarities across cities. In West Africa, Abidjan has the most developed formal private sector (about 18 percent of jobs). Dakar is in second place with 15 percent. Niamey posts the largest concentration of public sector jobs, but they account for just 15 percent of total employment. Cotonou and Lomé are leading cities for the informal sector, which accounts for more than 80 percent of jobs.
Even sharper contrasts are found in Central Africa and Madagascar. At one end of the scale is Kinshasa, where 71 percent of jobs are in the informal sector, the public sectors employs 17 percent of the workforce, and the formal private sector employs just 9 percent of the workforce (the smallest share of the 11 cities). At the other end of the scale are the Cameroonian and Malagasy cities, where a smaller (albeit still high) share (53-62 percent) of jobs are in the informal sector.
Public Sector
Public jobs are naturally concentrated in the nonmarket sectors. However, industrial employment accounts for 25 percent of jobs in semi-public enterprises, a slightly higher share than in the labor market as a whole (21 percent). Women are less well represented in public employment (26 percent) than in the labor market as a whole (45 percent). In all cities, the highest proportion of migrants (70 percent) is found in the public sector (table 1.13). Public sector employees are more skilled than the rest of the labor force. Employees in this sector have by far the highest level of education (12 completed years of education). Public sector employees have more than 10 years seniority on average, compared with just 6 in the other sectors. Th e longer tenure refl ects the job-for-life phenomenon as well as the freeze on recruitment.
Formal Private Sector
Th e formal private sector has the highest rate of wage employment (86 percent across all the cities) aft er the public sector. Th irty-fi ve percent of employed workers in the sector work in businesses with fewer than 10 people (21 percent work in businesses with fewer than 6 people); 26 percent work in businesses with more than 100 people. In Bamako, Ouagadougou, Lomé, Niamey, Cotonou, and Yaoundé the majority of formal private sector jobs are in establishments that employ a maximum of 20 people.
Th e average age (34) is much lower than in the public sector (42). Formal private sector employees have an average of 9.3 years of education, second only to workers in the public sector.
Informal Sector
Th e informal sector is similar in all cities in terms of age (young), activities, the size of the production unit (small), and rates of wage employment (low). Ninety percent of informal sector jobs are in production units with fewer than six people, and 54 percent are own-account workers. Th is sector has the lowest wage employment rate of all institutional sectors (17 percent).
Th ree-quarters of informal sector jobs are in trade and services. Trade accounts for half of all informal sector jobs in Bamako, one-third in Niamey and Dakar, and 56 percent in Kinshasa. However, the industrial sector is not inconsequential; it provides 21 percent of informal sector jobs (25-32 percent in Dakar, Niamey, and Ouagadougou). Sixty-eight percent of industrial jobs (70 percent in WAEMU) are informal. Only in Antananarivo is the formal sector developed enough to provide more than half (54 percent) of industrial jobs.
Across the 11 cities, about 20 percent of informal sector workers work on proper professional premises (more than 25 percent in Abidjan and Dakar, 20 percent in Antananarivo, 9 percent in Niamey). Fourteen percent of informal sector workers work from home without dedicated facilities (20 percent in Kinshasa, 18 percent in Niamey, and 17 percent in Cotonou); 6 percent of informal sector workers work from home in a space specifi cally set aside for the purpose (13 percent in Antananarivo and 10 percent in Cotonou). Across the 11 cities, 11 percent of workers are itinerant. Th ese percentages are higher in Lomé, Cotonou, and Bamako. Workers in the informal sector are young, with one-third of them under 25. With an average 5.4 years of education, more than 60 percent of informal workers have no more than primary school education (77 percent in the WAEMU countries).
Th e informal sector is also disproportionately female (53 percent). Th e percentage of women ranges from 41 percent in Niamey to 60 percent in Cotonou and Lomé. Contrary to a widely held belief that migration is responsible for the development of the informal sector, the sector actually contains the lowest proportion of migrants (about 50 percent).
Informal Employment
Th e ILO (2003) defi nes informal employment as employment that does not provide coverage in the institutional social protection scheme. Workers in this sector include the vast majority of the informal labor force and unprotected employees in the formal sector (Herrera and others 2012). We defi ne informal employment as all contributing family workers, all independent workers in the informal sector, and all employees without written contracts and not benefi ting from social protection.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from table 1.13 and the detailed results by country (not reported to save space). First, informal employment is dominant: on average, 77 percent of the labor force is informally employed. Th e largest shares are in Lomé (83 percent), Cotonou and Bamako (82 percent), and Ouagadougou (81 percent); the smallest share is in Antananarivo (62 percent).
Second, informal employment is signifi cant in every institutional sector. As expected, nearly all informal sector jobs (97 percent) are informal. But informal employment represents 41 percent of private formal sector jobs (26 percent in Antananarivo, 33 percent in Abidjan and Dakar, and 36 percent in Kinshasa). Cameroonian cities have both the highest proportion of formal sector jobs and the highest rate of informal jobs in the formal sector (50 percent in Douala and 58 percent in Yaoundé). Informal employment also accounts for 8 percent of public administration jobs and 11 percent of public enterprise jobs.
Composition of Working Labor Force by Age Bracket
Th ree main groups account for virtually the entire working labor force studied: self-employment in the informal sector (in the form of own-account work or work as an employer) (48 percent); wage employment in the public and private formal sector (27 percent); and dependent employment in the informal sector as an employee, apprentice, or contributing family worker (22 percent) (fi gure 1.2) . Th e remaining 3 percent are nonwage workers in the formal sector.
Up to the age of about 20, the majority of employed workers work in the informal sector (96 percent among people 10-14, 90 percent among people 15-19, and 80 percent among people 20-24), mainly in dependent employment. Th e second period sees the emergence of wage employment in the formal sector as a labor market integration mode. Th is curve rises steadily through age 55.
Aft er 55, individuals return to informal sector jobs as self-employed workers. Up to 80 percent of jobs held aft er age 69 are in self-employment.
It is tempting to interpret this age-based curve in terms of the professional life cycle: workers fi rst acquire informal sector work experience, then integrate into the formal sector as wage earners before setting up in self-employment at the end of the working life with human and fi nancial capital accumulated in the previous stage. In fact, only panel data on the entire life cycle or backwardlooking surveys (biographical-type surveys) could bear out this three-phase trajectory at the individual level.
Labor Income and Working Conditions
Labor provides most of the income received by African individuals and households. Analyzing this indicator therefore evaluates the quality of the jobs generated by the diff erent productive sectors and measures the standard of living and extent of poverty in the 11 cities studied. Th e analysis at this stage concentrates on nominal incomes (further analysis converts these data into real incomes using purchasing power parity). As with all household surveys, capturing incomes is an extremely tricky business (see overview). Th e following fi ndings should therefore be interpreted with caution. In particular, more attention should be paid to within-city than between-city diff erences and to the aggregates for the region. 
Earnings in Main Job
Th e average monthly earned income across all 11 cities is estimated at €72 (including contributing family workers' zero earnings). Th is average conceals large disparities (table 1.14). Average earnings in West Africa are €83. Th e highest earnings are in Abidjan (€108) and Dakar (€89). By far the lowest earnings are in Lomé (€39). Th e situation elsewhere ranges from barely €20 in Kinshasa to €52 in Antananarivo and more than €100 in Cameroon. Public sector workers are better paid than workers in the private sector. An employee in a public enterprise earns €163 and a civil servant in the administration €208, whereas an employee in a formal private business earns just €116 a month. Th e lowest income is in the informal sector, where monthly earnings average just €52.
Th e higher earnings of public sector employees partly refl ect the characteristics of the manpower employed in the sector, where senior and middle managers account for 59 percent of jobs (as opposed to 20 percent in the formal private sector). Th e percentage of managers in the public sector ranges from 37 percent in Lomé to 69 percent in Abidjan and 72 percent in Bamako.
Average seniority is also higher in the public sector (10 years versus about 6 in the formal private sector) (table 1.15). Average tenure in the public sector is shorter in Douala (eight years), Ouagadougou (seven years), and Yaoundé (fi ve years).
Distribution of Earnings
Average monthly earnings vary by industry (table 1.16). Civil servants are at the top of the ladder. Civil servants in Dakar earn 10 times more than "small street traders"; civil servants in Cotonou earn 6.8 times more than workers in "clothing. " Th e smallest gap is in Bamako, where civil servants earn 3.8 times more than "small street traders. " In general, small traders are paid the least.
Th e minimum monthly wage ranges from €9 in Kinshasa to €59 in Dakar (table 1.17). Even within WAEMU, the range is wide (€21 in Lomé to €59 in Dakar). About half of workers earn less than the minimum wage in West Africa, ranging from 44 percent in Bamako to 61 percent in Ouagadougou. Th e proportion is lower elsewhere (about 40 percent in Antananarivo and Kinshasa and 30 percent in Cameroon). Th is fi nding reveals clear shortcomings in compliance with the legislation in force. Th e percentage of workers earning less than the minimum wage is highest in the informal sector. At the other end of the scale, about 10 percent of workers are paid more than four times the minimum wage in all cities except Yaoundé and Douala, where the minimum wage has not been adjusted for many years and the share of workers earning more than four times the minimum wage stands at about 20 percent. All in all, the minimum wage does not seem to be a binding constraint in any institutional sector. Th e African Economic Outlook 2012 (African Development Bank and others 2012) confi rms this result, concluding that "minimum wage is not an issue. " Th e distribution of earned income can also be analyzed by comparing quartiles and the interquartile ratio (table 1.18). Median monthly earnings are much lower than average earnings, partly because of the large number of unpaid workers. When unpaid workers are excluded, the gap between median and average earnings narrows, although median earnings still remain much lower. On average, workers in the third quartile of the distribution earn fi ve times more than workers in the fi rst quartile. Th is ratio is highest in Bamako and Niamey (about 6) and lowest in Cotonou and Dakar (about 4). Th e gaps are wider in West Africa than in Central Africa and Madagascar.
Taking into account people who work without being paid (zero earnings), especially contributing family workers, the Gini coeffi cients are similar across cities (table 1.19). In West Africa, they range from 0.59 in Dakar to 0.64 in Ouagadougou. Antananarivo stands out, with a lower albeit still fairly high level of inequality of 0.53. Th is fi nding refl ects the higher rate of wage employment in Antananarivo, especially in the formal sector.
With no eff ective labor market regulatory mechanisms, earnings inequalities are very high in all cities. Gini indexes at the household level are of the same order of magnitude, suggesting that no compensating mechanisms are at work within households to mitigate individual inequalities.
Gender Diff erences
On average, women's earnings are half of men's (table 1.20) . Women are even worse off when their incomes are viewed in terms of median earnings: their median remuneration is about one-third of men's. Th is gap refl ects the weight of contributing family workers, who are overwhelmingly female.
Th ese fi ndings are similar across cities, although the ranking depends on the indicator used. Based on average remuneration, comparisons show women to be best off in Central Africa and Madagascar (where the male/female ratio is about 1.6), Dakar (1.87), and Niamey (1.94). Th ey are worst off in Cotonou (2.51) and Bamako (2.59) (see chapter 9).
Th e second gender-related characteristic of earned income is the higher inequality among women than among men. One of the reasons for this difference is the weight of informal sector jobs, which are less egalitarian than jobs in other sectors. Ouagadougou has both the largest within-gender earnings inequalities and the widest gender gap.
Earnings Ladder
Th e earnings ladder is evident across all institutional sectors (table 1.21). Managers and employers earn the most. Th ey are better paid in the formal private sector than in the public sector, except in Lomé and Cotonou. Next come manual and nonmanual employees, with laborers and others (apprentices and family workers) earning least. In the formal sector, internal heterogeneity is greater in the private sector than in the public sector: formal private sector managers earn two to three times more than manual and nonmanual employees. Th e ratio between managers and laborers ranges from 6 (in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar) to more than 8 (in Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou). Th ere is less wage inequality in the public sector, where managers earn no more than twice the wages of manual and nonmanual employees and up to four times more than laborers. On average, the formal private sector pays its managers relatively more and the public sector pays its low-skilled employees relatively more.
Th e informal sector is the worst-paid sector, both because of the predominance of the least skilled categories of workers and because workers in the informal sector earn less than their counterparts in other sectors (see chapter 5). Own-account workers in the informal sector generally earn less than half the wages of manual and nonmanual employees in the formal sector. However, except in Ouagadougou, they earn more than the monthly minimum wage in all cities.
Working Hours and Underemployment
Th e average work week is 48 hours for formal private sector workers, 44 hours for workers in public enterprises, and 42 hours in public administration (table 1.22) . Informal sector workers also work long hours (more than 47 hours a week). Th is sector is thus not a source of marginal, part-time jobs; it leaves little time to work a second job. Th e longest weekly hours are in Lomé and Ouagadougou (about 50 hours a week). Th e average work week is 45 hours in Dakar and 43 in Antananarivo.
Diff erences in the work week are very wide in the cities studied: one in fi ve workers works less than 35 hours a week and 41 percent work more than 48 hours. Th e formal sector (public and private) is the most compliant with legislation on work duration: 70 percent of workers in the sector work 35-48 hours a week. In contrast, just 30 percent of informal sector workers work these hours. Th e work week is much longer in the informal sector, where 46 percent of workers work more than 48 hours a week (the fi gure is 29 percent in the formal sector).
Time-related underemployment. Th e number of hours worked reveals the amount of time-related underemployment. Fift een percent of employed workers-more than 1 million people-involuntarily work less than 35 hours a week (table 1.23) . Th e rate of time-related underemployment varies across cities (10 percent in Ouagadougou and Yaoundé, 17 percent in Bamako and Lomé, and 20 percent in Kinshasa). It is highest in the informal sector (16 percent).
Invisible underemployment. Time-related underemployment is just one manifestation of underemployment. For example, excessively long working hours can (paradoxically) be a sign of underemployment when they are made necessary by abnormally low labor productivity. Th is form of underemployment is called invisible underemployment.
We have chosen the percentage of employed workers earning less than the minimum hourly wage as our indicator of invisible underemployment. On this basis, we estimate the rate of invisible underemployment at 48 percent across all 11 cities. It is highest in Ouagadougou (66.5 percent). Even in Bamako, it stands at more than 45 percent. Outside West Africa, the rate of invisible underemployment is lower, albeit still high, at about 40 percent.
Intercity comparisons need to be interpreted in relative terms, because the purchasing power of the minimum wage in force is not necessarily the same across cities, and wage policies do not necessarily pursue the same objective. Th e minimum wage should therefore be seen more as a social standard associated with a national environment than as a universal and absolute benchmark (physiological minimum for subsistence, for example). Th is manifestation of the mismatch between labor supply and demand is most glaring in the informal sector, where 60 percent of workers are in a situation of invisible underemployment (two-thirds in WAEMU); this share is much lower among formal private sector workers (28 percent), civil servants (14 percent), and public enterprise employees (8 percent).
Another indicator of underemployment is the NEET (not in employment, education, or training) rate, which takes into account discouraged workers. Among people 10-24, the NEET rate is 23 percent in West Africa (31 percent in Dakar and 34 percent in Niamey), 22 percent in Kinshasa, 14 percent in Cameroon, and 10 percent in Madagascar (see table 1.23) . Th e NEET rate for young women is twice as high as for young men, except in Niamey, Kinshasa, and particularly Antananarivo, where both the levels and the gap (3.5 percentage points) are lowest.
When the diff erent components of underemployment (unemployment, timerelated underemployment, and invisible underemployment) are aggregated to obtain a composite indicator of underemployment, the total underemployment rate is 62 percent-5 million out of nearly 8 million workers-across all 11 cities. Total underemployment aff ects almost 60 percent of workers in Bamako and almost 75 percent in Ouagadougou. Women are more aff ected than men, whatever the type of underemployment (19 percent for women and 12 percent for men for visible underemployment; 61 percent for women and 38 percent for men for invisible underemployment). Underemployment of the labor force therefore seems to be the main problem in the labor market and, more generally, the region's urban economy (see chapter 2).
Working Conditions and Dependent Workers' Benefi ts
Job quality is conditioned by more than just earnings and working hours. Other factors, such as the steadiness of the job, the provision of an employment contract, the existence of social security coverage and paid holidays, and promotion opportunities and in-house training, are also important. Th is subsection focuses on dependent workers (employees, contributing family workers, and apprentices), because independent workers are not covered by labor legislations.
Nearly 9 in 10 jobs are permanent across all 11 cities. Niamey leads in the share of casual jobs (19 percent of all jobs). In the informal sector, 85 percent of jobs are permanent jobs. Th erefore, job insecurity does not manifest itself in a string of "odd jobs" and short-term jobs.
Job insecurity is expressed in the low level of employment contracts. Nearly two-thirds of employees have no written contract with their employer, and an equivalent proportion do not receive a payslip (table 1.24). Labor relations vary a great deal by institutional sector. In the informal sector, just 9 percent of dependent workers have a written contract, and less than 3 percent receive payslips.
Another indicator of poor job quality is the small share of workers with welfare benefi ts: 9.1 percent of workers are affi liated with the offi cial social security body, and 3.3 percent have health insurance provided by the business. Diff erences are evident across institutional sectors. One-third of public sector employees have social security coverage, and 47 percent are entitled to paid holidays. Th ese fi gures are much higher than in the formal private sector, where 12 percent of employees have social security coverage and 28 percent are entitled to paid holidays. Dependent workers in the informal sector appear to be totally deprived of these benefi ts. Th e gap between the two sectors is widened by the fact that the majority of informal workers are self-employed. Welfare and other benefi ts (allowances, job security, and so forth) are more common among the highest-paid socioeconomic groups, accentuating the diff erences in job quality (see chapter 4).
Union membership remains low among dependent workers. It stands at 13 percent in West Africa (ranging from 7 percent in Cotonou to 17 percent in Niamey). It is 15 percent in Kinshasa and less than 10 percent in Cameroon and Antananarivo. Unions are more widespread in the public sector: about onethird of public employees are union members as opposed to from one-tenth (Central Africa) to one-fi ft h (West Africa) in the formal private sector and less than 2 percent in the informal sector.
Job Mobility and Prospects
Data from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys can be used to quantify the quality of the match between the jobs people hold and the jobs they aspire to hold. Th e nature of the mismatches captures potential labor market rigidities, which can aff ect labor force participation rates, unemployment, and remuneration. Th e analysis in this section covers only people 15-24, because this generation constitutes the vast majority of people entering the labor market currently or in the near future. Some 4.6 million people 15-24 live in the 11 cities studied: 2.7 million are inactive, 1.5 million have jobs, and 341,000 (18 percent) are unemployed. Among jobholders, 38 percent report being satisfi ed with the position they hold and do not intend to look for another job in the near future. Fift y-two percent would like to fi nd a new job, either by changing establishment (41 percent) or by being promoted within their current establishment.
Th e high level of job dissatisfaction decreases with age, falling to 44 percent among people 30-39 and 14 percent among people 60 and older. Th is phenomenon stems from two factors. Th e fi rst is the "normal" life-cycle eff ect, in which work experience and seniority enable young people to secure better-quality jobs. Th e second is the fact that the depressed labor market is preventing young people from entering jobs that correspond to their skills (see chapter 3).
Young civil servants are more inclined to want to keep their jobs (59 percent) than young people working in the informal sector (37 percent). Surprisingly, this diff erence virtually disappears in West Africa, where 34 percent of young civil servants and 35 percent of young people in the informal sector are dissatisfi ed. However, among people who want to change jobs, proportionally more young civil servants would like to remain with their current institution.
Th e level of dissatisfaction is negatively correlated with remuneration. In West Africa, for example, "satisfi ed" young people earn an average of €35 a month, whereas people who would like to change jobs earn just €27 a month and people hoping for promotion earn €29. Th is hierarchy is found irrespective of the institutional sector, socioeconomic group, or city. A similar pattern is found outside West Africa, with the only diff erence being that people who would like to be promoted earn more than people who want to keep their job. Th e diff erence refl ects the fact that the prospects for promotion are restricted mainly to the highest-paid jobs.
Th e mismatch between young people's preferences and real job opportunities is huge. Although the public sector (administration and public enterprises) created virtually no jobs in the two years preceding the survey (less than 4 percent of new jobs), 27 percent of young people still aspire to work in it (table 1.25) . Th e informal sector, the main job provider during the two years before the survey, holds less drawing power for young people. In West Africa, for example, the sector accounted for 82 percent of job creation, but just 48 percent of job-seekers aspired to work in it. Th ese fi ndings are common to all 11 cities, although the extent to which aspirations are unrealistic varies considerably. Young people in Abidjan take the least account of the actual situation. Although fewer than 10,000 civil service jobs were fi lled in Abidjan in 2001-02, 140,000 young people aspired to secure one. Young people in Niamey have their feet a little more fi rmly on the ground: the city recruits about 5,000 civil servants from a pool of 27,000 young hopefuls. Yaoundé is unique, in that the jobs created are on the whole in line with aspirations. Analysis of socioeconomic groups confi rms that young people's ambitions are unrealistic. In West Africa, for example, nearly 35 percent of young people want to become managers, even though just 5 percent of positions are in management. Th e situation is similar in Antananarivo, Douala, and Kinshasa. Yaoundé displays similar patterns. Although young people appear to shun the idea of becoming laborers, contributing family workers, or apprentices (only 7 percent aspire to these occupations), these jobs account for 30-40 percent of jobs created.
Th ese fi ndings suggest that young job-seekers are heading for serious disappointment, which, if not corrected, could generate major social tensions. Although problems have not yet emerged and it is not a new issue (Berthelier and Roubaud 1993) .
Adjustments need to be made in two directions. First, young people need to be made to understand that wage employment is not the be-all and end-all of a successful career and that the link between a university education and public employment is a thing of the past. Schools should prepare their students to envisage the possibility of setting up their own business by steering the curriculum more toward vocational training. Second, greater fairness and transparency are needed in managing formal sector jobs, particularly in the public sector. A more equitable distribution of these jobs needs to be promoted-by, for example, encouraging voluntary redundancies and early retirement to open the door for more qualifi ed and motivated young people (see ILO 2010). 
